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This article primarily focuses on transfer pricing aspects of intercompany loans. The analysis will take into consideration the current Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD transfer pricing guidelines as well as the revised transfer pricing guidance issued under the
OECD/G20’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan. Moreover, the impact of other BEPS related actions on intercompany loans
and their relationship with transfer pricing rules is discussed. Finally, the author concludes by making a suggestion to the OECD to adopt his
analysis when providing transfer-pricing guidance on intercompany loans.
1 INTRODUCTION: INTERCOMPANY LOANS
1. Over the past decade, tax authorities from several
jurisdictions have significantly increased their focus on
transfer pricing aspects of cross-border related party
financial transactions1 such as intercompany loans,
financial guarantees2 and cash pooling arrangements3.
This attention is especially evident in the international
arena where cross-border debt financing can lead to
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).
2. Article 9 of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model4
endorses the arm’s length principle for pricing
transactions between associated enterprises. This
means that, from a transfer pricing perspective,
intercompany loans among associated enterprises
have to be at arm’s length. It should be noted
that Article 9(1), by itself, does not authorize
States to make arm’s length primary adjustments
(structural or price adjustments). The adjustment
provisions have to be authorized by the domestic
law of the State. Article 9(1), on the other hand,
restricts the application of such domestic law
provisions. This implies that profits of associated
enterprises can only be adjusted up to arm’s
length conditions or an arm’s length profit5.
3. The purpose of this contribution is to discuss as
to when an intercompany loan can be considered to
be at arm’s length? To answer this question, the
author initially discusses the situations wherein a
loan arrangement can be re-characterized or disre-
garded in the borrowers State under the arm’s length
principle. When recognized, the author proposes a
two-step approach to undertake an arm’s length
Notes
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analysis of intercompany loans. Moreover, the ques-
tion also arises as to when a lender should be allo-
cated the returns with respect to the debt funding?
The analysis will be done in light of the current
OECD transfer pricing guidelines6 and the revised
guidance issued pursuant to the BEPS Action Plan7,
in particular, Action 8–108. The impact of Action
13 on financing arrangements will also be discussed9
(see section 2). Subsequently, the impact of other
BEPS related actions (and recent European Union
[EU] developments) from a borrower and lender
perspective, on intra-group loans is put forward
and their relationship with transfer pricing rules is
examined (see section 3). Finally, the author con-
cludes by discussing the way forward (see section 4).
2 TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS
OF INTERCOMPANY LOANS IN LIGHT
OF THE BEPS ACTION PLAN
2.1 Borrowers State: Non Recognition
of Loans
2.1.1 Is It a Loan for Domestic Law Purposes?
4. At the outset, the question arises as to under what
situations can intercompany loans be re-characterized or
non-recognized from the borrowers State’s perspective?
In the author’s opinion, when dealing with intercom-
pany loans, as an initial step it needs to be ascertained as
to whether the funding arrangement qualifies as a loan or
something else (such as equity) for domestic law
purposes10. For instance, from a Dutch perspective,
loans are generally recognized under civil law relations
i.e. the form over substance approach. However, under
established case law, loans are considered to be equity
when the facts and circumstances indicate that (1) the
loan is essentially a disguised capital contribution, (2) the
loan gives the lender a right to participate in the bor-
rowers business (profit participating loan) or, (3) when
the receivable arising from the loan has no or little value
since the outset (loan without any repayment clauses)11.
2.1.2 Re-characterization of Loans Under the Arm’s
Length Provision
2.1.2.1. Article 9(1): Re-characterization of Debt
to Equity
5. Even if the loan arrangement is recognized for
domestic law purposes, the question arises as to
whether Article 9(1) allows a State to re-characterize
the loan arrangement (entire arrangement or a part of
the arrangement) between associated enterprises if it is
not at arm’s length12? The OECD, in light of its
report on thin capitalization13, is of the view that
Article 9(1) ‘is relevant not only in determining whether
the rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s
length rate, but also whether a prima facie loan can be
regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind
of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital’14.
6. However, this position has been criticized in
academic literature. It is stated that Article 9(1)
can only be used to determine whether the interest
rate charged on loans between associated enterprises
Notes
6 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD Guidelines) (OECD 22 July 2010).
7 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013).
8 These Actions have led to changes in Ch. I (guidance for applying the arm’s length principle), Ch. II (Transfer Pricing Methods), Ch. VI (Intangibles), Ch. VII (Intra Group
Services) and Ch. VIII (Cost Contribution Arrangements). See OECD/G20, BEPS, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, (OECD Revised Guidelines on Action
8–10) (OECD/G20 05 Oct. 2015).
9 This Action has led to changes in Ch. V (Transfer Pricing Documentation). See OECD/G20, BEPS, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country by Country reporting, (OECD
Revised Guidelines on Action 13) (OECD/G20 05 Oct. 2015).
10 The 1979 OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines acknowledged that for tax reasons equity contributions could be disguised as loans and thereafter laid out the various
approaches followed by the OECD member countries to distinguish between equity and debt. The guidelines recommended that a flexible approach should be followed by
States to reclassify debt to equity. This approach would take into consideration various factors to determine whether debt is actually equity. The factors include 1) whether
the principal amount of the loan is payable at a future date, 2) whether the loan is subordinated to the rights of other creditors, 3) whether the debt is convertible to equity,
4) whether the parties intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship & 5) whether the debt-equity ratio exceeds a certain percentage etc. The guidelines provided that it
would not be desirable, to use a hard and fast debt equity ratio to convert debt to equity. See OECD, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (OECD 1979 Guidelines)
(1 June 1979), paras 184–191; Also see para. 25, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 10 (2014).
11 J. Reyneveld & M. Bonekamp, Non Business Motivated Loans: Considerations from an Economic Perspective, 19(3) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 227–228 (2012); A. Bobeldijk & R.
Velden, The ‘Non-Businesslike Loan’: A New Doctrine for the Tax Treatment of Equity and Debt Capital in the Netherlands, 43(3) Intertax 277–278 (2015); Similar rules exist in
other countries. For Australia – see P. Balkus & M. Heath, Australia in Transfer Pricing and Intra Group Financing 66–68 (IBFD 2012). For USA – see M. Calva, K.
Chandrasekhar & M. Gaffney, United States in Transfer Pricing and Intra Group Financing 530–532 (IBFD 2012).
12 The domestic law should authorize the structural adjustment. For a detailed discussion on whether or not Art. 9(1) allows for a structural adjustments see Bullen, supra n. 5,
at 231–273.
13 OECD, Thin Capitalization) (26 Nov. 1986), paras 48–49.
14 See para. 3(b), OECD Model: Commentary on Article 9 (2014).
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is at arm’s length or not and cannot be used to re-
characterize debt to equity. The view is based mainly
on a literal reading of Article 9(1) which provides
that adjustments can be made for ‘conditions … made
or imposed … between the two enterprises in their commer-
cial or financial relations’. It is argued that an exam-
ination of the contracted terms which have already
been made or imposed needs to be undertaken for
the purpose of Article 9(1) rather than the entire
contract itself. Put differently, the term ‘condi-
tions … made or imposed’ only refers to the terms of
the contract (such as interest rate) and not to the
existing financial relations between the associated
enterprises. Thus, Article 9(1) would not permit a
re-characterization of debt to equity15.
7. On the contrary, other commentators suggest
that the view proposed against such re-characteriza-
tion is extremely narrow as Article 9(1) is broad and
indeed covers situations where debt can be re-charac-
terized as equity. This is because the word ‘imposed’ in
relation to the word ‘conditions’ indicates that not only
the contractual terms but also other terms i.e. the
overall financial relations of the associated enterprises
are to be taken into consideration16. The author agrees
with this line of reasoning and suggests that Article 9
(1) should be interpreted broadly and the word
‘imposed’ in relation to the word ‘conditions’ in the
sentence ‘conditions … made or imposed … between the
two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations’
indicates that not only the contractual terms but also
other terms i.e. overall financial relations of the asso-
ciated enterprises are to be taken into consideration.
In the next section, the author discusses situations
wherein a loan arrangement can be re-characterized.
2.1.2.2 Loans Exceeding the Borrowers Borrowing
Capacity
8. The current guidelines (in Section D of Chapter I)
provide that tax administrations should analyse a
transaction as structured and undertaken by the tax-
payer. However, in two exceptional cases, tax
administrations may disregard the actual transaction
or substitute it for alternate transactions.17 The first
circumstance arises when the form and economic sub-
stance of a transaction do not coincide. This is illu-
strated through a thin capitalization example. In that
example one related party provides an interest-bearing
loan to another related party even though the latters
‘relevant economic circumstances’ indicate that the invest-
ment would not be structured in the form of a loan. In
such circumstances, the tax authorities may character-
ize the arrangement in accordance with its substance
and treat the funding as a capital contribution18.
9. The revised guidance also states that the applica-
tion of the arm’s length principle requires a compar-
ison of the related party transactions with comparable
uncontrolled transactions. Two features of this analy-
sis are to: (1) identify the commercial or financial
terms between related parties and the economically
relevant aspects attached to such terms in order to
properly delineate the related party transactions, and
(2) undertake a comparability analysis to compare
the controlled transactions with uncontrolled
transactions.19 The first step requires an analysis of
the commercial or financial relations of the controlled
transaction. Specifically, the focus is set on identifying
the ‘economically relevant characteristics’ of these com-
mercial or financial relations. These characteristics
comprise of (1) the contractual terms of the transac-
tions, (2) a functional analysis, (3) the characteristics
of the property transferred or services provided, (4)
economic circumstances of the parties and the market
in which the parties operate and (5) the business
strategies pursued by the parties20. The identification
of these characteristics is essential because indepen-
dent parties look into these characteristics in order to
make decisions about whether or not to enter into a
transaction. Moreover, independent parties consider
the other options realistically available to them in
light of these characteristics, and they will ‘only enter
into the transaction if they see no alternative that offers a
better opportunity to meet their commercial objectives’21.
Essentially, when the commercial or financial relations
Notes
15 F. Hosson & M. Michielse, Treaty Aspects of the ‘thin capitalization’ Issue – A Review of the OECD Report, 17(11) Intertax 480 (1989); Wittendorff, supra n. 5, at 115–120.
16 L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse 505 (IBFD Doctoral Series 2008).
17 OECD Guidelines, para. 1.64.
18 OECD Guidelines, para. 1.65. This example is deleted in the revised guidance. Also see OECD 1979 Guidelines, para. 23.
19 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 1.33.
20 Ibid., para. 1.36.
21 Ibid., para. 1.38.
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agreed between associated enterprises are not aligned
with the economically relevant characteristics (or eco-
nomic substance), tax authorities may delineate the
transaction based on ‘the characteristics of the transaction
reflected in the conduct of the parties’22 (its economic
substance)23.
10. Interestingly, the question arises as to how do
we determine the borrowers ‘relevant economic circum-
stances’ or ‘economically relevant characteristics’ to deter-
mine if a loan is to be provided in an arm’s length
situation? In the author’s opinion, the ‘could’ analysis
can be used to answer this question. The analysis,
which is seen from the lenders perspective, addresses
the following question24: could the borrowing entity
obtain a similar level of debt from a third party
lender? Specifically, the analysis focuses on what a
lender would be prepared to lend to the borrower
taking into consideration the latters (including but
not limited to) features such as (1) capacity to bor-
row, (2) risk of default, (3) assets that can be pro-
vided as securities, (4) liabilities that can have a
negative effect on the intercompany loans, and (5)
the industry in which the borrower operates and (6)
the borrowers debt service ability. Essentially, at the
core of the could analysis, a credit rating evaluation25
of the borrower on a standalone basis, as adjusted for
implicit support, is required to be undertaken (see
section 2.2.1). The analysis, will lead to understand-
ing the debt capacity of the borrower.
11. If all the facts and circumstances, after under-
taking the analysis, indicate that independent par-
ties (such as banks) would lend to the borrower
then the borrowers State should not re-characterize
the borrowing transaction. On the contrary, if all
the facts and circumstances indicate that indepen-
dent parties would not lend to the borrower, as the
borrowers credit rating would not support the loan
amount and the terms and conditions on which it is
provided then the tax authorities in the borrowers
State may re-characterize the borrowing transaction
to reflect an arm’s length amount26. For instance,
consider the following example: The could analysis
of Company C indicates that it has an overall arm’s
length borrowing capacity of USD 1,000. However,
its related party, Company B, grants it a loan
amounting to USD 1,500. As independent lenders
would grant Company C a loan of only USD 1,000,
the excess amount of USD 500 should be re-char-
acterized. As stated previously, the re-characteriza-
tion may take the form of a capital contribution27.
2.1.2.3 Commercially Irrational Loans
12. Furthermore, the current guidance (second
circumstance)28 as well as revised guidance provides
that the related party transaction can be disregarded
and replaced with another arrangement if the related
party arrangement, viewed holistically, differs from
those which would have been adopted by indepen-
dent enterprises behaving in ‘a commercially rational
manner’ thereby preventing the determination of a
price that would be acceptable to both parties taking
into account their respective perspectives and their
realistically available options29.
13. In the present context, the question arises as to
whether an intercompany loan can be disregarded
even if the borrowers borrowing capacity would sup-
port an arm’s length debt and interest? In the
Notes
22 Ibid., para. 1.120.
23 The current guidance, in the chapter that deals with business restructurings, also provides that re-characterization can take place when economic substance of the transaction
or arrangement differs from its form. Substance is determined by ‘examining all of the facts and circumstances, such as the economic and commercial context of the transaction or
arrangement, its object and effect from a practical and business point of view, and the conduct of the parties, including the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by them’. See OECD
Guidelines, para. 9.170.
24 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 15; Damji, Diakonova & Brügger, supra n. 1, at 189.
25 This evaluation estimates the ability of the borrowing entity to repay its debt.
26 It could be argued that the related borrower, due to its limited financial means, would not have been able to borrow the funds from an independent lender. Accordingly, in
circumstances where related lenders provide the loan even though the related borrowers financial position will not be able to support it, appropriate recharacterizations can
be made to reflect the increased risk of the lender. See Bullen, supra n. 5, at 463–469.
27 Bullen, supra n. 5, at 469. Such recharacterization should be restricted to the loan arrangement and does not warrant an entire re-characterization of the borrowers capital
structure. Moreover, the amount of adjustment must be restricted to an arm’s length amount. For instance, the interest amount on the loan exceeding the borrowers
borrowing capacity is disallowed as a deduction as opposed to disallowing the entire interest amount. Bullen, supra n. 5, at 471–472.
28 OECD Guidelines, para. 1.65.
29 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 1.22. Also see OECD Guidelines, paras 9.171–9.179. At the outset, it should be noted that Art. 9(1) states that the terms and
conditions of related party transactions should be compared with terms and conditions of unrelated party transactions. There is no reference to conditions made by
independent enterprises behaving in a ‘commercially rational manner’. Therefore, this does not seem to be an appropriate arm’s length test. See M. Lange, P. Lankhorst & R.
Hafkenscheid, (Non-) Recognition of Transactions Between Associated Enterprises: On Behaving in a Commercially Rational Manner, Decision Making Traps and BEPS, 22(2) Intl.
Transfer Pricing J. 85–86 (2015).
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author’s opinion, the ‘would’ analysis can be used to
answer this question. The analysis, which is seen
from the borrowers perspective, addresses the follow-
ing question30: would the borrowing entity actually
borrow a similar amount at arm’s length given the
performance of its business? Specifically, the analysis
focuses on under what conditions a borrower would
have borrowed at arm’s length taking into considera-
tion (including but not limited to) features such as
(1) its financial situation, (2) the amount of debt and
whether taking that amount leaves room to absorb
cyclical or seasonal variations, unforeseen events or a
fluctuation in interest rates or profits, (3) its costs of
borrowing, (4) its debt servicing ability and the
possibility to have sufficient cash to operate as a
profitable organization, and (5) whether the bor-
rower would have taken the loan at all.
14. If all the facts and circumstances, after under-
taking the analysis, indicate that the borrower would
have entered into the transaction then the loan
should be respected. On the contrary, if all the
facts and circumstances indicate that the borrower
would not enter into the transaction then the loan
may be re-characterized. For instance, consider the
following example: Company C has an overall arm’s
length borrowing capacity of USD 1,000. Till date,
it has borrowed funds up to USD 600 from its
related party (for undertaking commercial activities).
Its un-used arm’s length borrowing capacity
amounts to USD 400. Consequently, in order to
maximize the amount of deductible interest available
to it, Company C decides to increase its related party
debt to achieve a level closer to an arm’s length
amount even though there is no commercial or busi-
ness need to do so. Accordingly, Company C borrows
funds from its related party viz., Company B. The
principal reason to take a loan is to generate an
interest deduction. On one hand, the taxpayer
could argue that the loan should not be disregarded,
as the debt and interest amount does not exceed the
borrowers borrowing capacity31. However, on the
other hand, the tax authorities could argue that the
borrower did not need a loan and used it solely to
generate interest deductions. Moreover, the transac-
tion was entered into only due to the group
relationship32. Consequently, there is no ‘commercial
rationale’ for the loan arrangement.
15. In the author’s opinion, the loan of USD 400
can be re-characterized if the taxpayer is not able to
demonstrate the business rationale for the loan.
Nevertheless, as long as the borrower can demon-
strate the commercial rationality for which it needs a
loan (such as for undertaking commercial activities)
then the author’s opinion is that the transaction
should not be disregarded33. Accordingly, the
threshold for disregarding the transaction under the
‘commercially rational’ standard is high34.
2.2 Setting Arm’s Length Prices
2.2.1 Borrowers Credit Rating
16. Once the loan funding arrangement is recog-
nized, a two-step process35 needs to be undertaken to
conduct a transfer pricing analysis of intercompany
loans. Firstly, the relevant economic characteristics
of the borrowing entity need to be established, in
particular, a credit rating evaluation of the borrow-
ing entity is required to be done. Secondly, an arm’s
length interest rate needs to be determined. The
arm’s length interest rate, fixed or floating, consists
of a base rate (risk free rate) that is determined on
the basis of currency and maturity and a credit
spread36 that is determined on the basis of the
risks undertaken by the lender with respect to the
lending transaction37.
Notes
30 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 15; Damji, Diakonova & Brügger, supra n. 1, at 189.
31 Bullen, supra n. 5, at 465.
32 See Her Majesty Revenue and Customs, Transfer Pricing: Thin Capitalization Legislation and Principles, INTM 413030.
33 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 1.123.
34 Lange, Lankhorst & Hafkenscheid, supra n. 29, at 88.
35 Damji, Diakonova & Brügger, supra n. 1, at 187; Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 15.
36 The OECD Guidelines provide that ‘in respect of financial services such as loans … remuneration would generally be built into the spread and it would not be appropriate to expect a further
service fee to be charged’. OECD Guidelines, para. 7.15.
37 For features of third party interest rates see – Her Majesty Revenue and Customs, Thin capitalization: Practical Guidance, INTM 522040.
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17. To reiterate, the could analysis entails an esti-
mation of the borrowers credit rating38. The ques-
tion arises as to what how does one determine the
credit rating of an entity? The best-known credit
rating agencies are Standard and Poor, Fitch and
Moody’s although other agencies also exist (such as
Dominion). In general, these agencies (and banks)
assign credit ratings on the basis of qualitative and
quantitative factors such as business/industry analy-
sis in which the borrower operates, operational risk
assessment of the borrower, financial statement ana-
lysis, cash flow analysis, forecast and probability
measurement analysis, credit scoring analysis and
comparable analysis.39 The credit rating (expressed
in terms of letters such as A – excellent, B –
moderate, C – poor and D – already in default)
obtained pursuant to the multi-pronged credit-
worthiness analysis lays the foundation to determine
under what conditions can a loan be issued in related
party settings. These agencies have also developed
credit rating models that can be licensed by compa-
nies (taxpayers). The companies can use these models
themselves to quickly estimate credit ratings on a
cost effective basis (in house ratings). These models
give a reasonable estimation of the borrowers credit
rating even though they do not provide in depth
analysis that an independent credit rating agency
will carry out. From a transfer pricing perspective
it becomes essential that the in-house rating is tested
to see whether the data and assumptions put into
place, produce a reasonable reliable outcome40.
18. Furthermore, the question arises as to whether
the credit rating of a borrower needs to be adjusted
for implicit support. The revised OECD guidance
discusses the following example (slightly modified
by the author). S is an entity with a Baa rating on a
standalone basis. With this rating, S is able to obtain
loans at an interest rate of 9%. However, as S is a
member of a multinational group, an independent
lender lends to S at an interest rate of 7% – the rate
that the lender would charge to borrowers with a
credit rating of A. At the same time, S obtains a loan
from a related party lender viz., T at rates applicable
to borrowers with an A rating i.e. at an interest rate
of 7% (all loan terms and conditions being similar).
The question arises as to whether the interest rate
charged by T to S is at arm’s length? The revised
OECD guidance answers the question in the affirma-
tive because the rate charged by T to S is the same as
the rate charged by an independent lender to S.
Moreover, it is stated that payment or comparability
adjustments need not be undertaken for the inciden-
tal (synergistic) benefit that S enjoys from being a
part of the multinational group, that is, its ability to
obtain a loan from an independent lender at lower
interest rates. Accordingly, the act of raising S’s
credit rating of few notches upwards by including
the synergistic benefit is justified41.
19. Likewise, in the context of analysing the ques-
tion of whether the provision of a guarantee amounts
to an intra-group service, the revised OECD gui-
dance provides that an intra-group service is pro-
vided when the provision of formal guarantee (a
deliberate concerted action by the parent) enhances
the credit rating of the subsidiary (for instance from
A to AAA) that thereby enables it to obtain a loan at
a lower rate (for instance at an interest rate of 5% –
the rate applicable to borrowers with aAAA rating)42.
On the contrary, if the subsidiary has a higher
credit rating (for instance – A) due to its group
membership than the credit rating it could achieve
on an individual basis (for instance – Baa) then no
service is provided by the parent to the subsidiary
as the latter company only receives an incidental
benefit by being associated with the group43. In the
former situation, guarantee fee is justified whereas
in the latter it is not. It is clearly stated that the
guarantee fee shall reflect the benefit of raising the
subsidiaries credit rating from A to AAA. On the
contrary, the uplift from Baa to A is attributable to
a synergistic benefit. Once again, in this example,
the standalone credit rating of the taxpayer is
Notes
38 The Finnish – OY and Australian – Chevron judgment (discussed in s. 2.2.4), confirm this position. Moreover, in the context of guarantee fees, the Canadian Court in the GE
capital case stressed on the credit rating of the borrower. See General Electric Capital Canada, Inc. v. Her Majesty The Queen 2009 TCC 563, aff’d 2010 FCA 344. Also see E.
Kamphuis, How to Deal with Affiliation in Interpreting the Arm’s Length Principle: The GE Case Reviewed, 17(4) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 292–297 (2010); I. Verlinden, P. Boone
& C. Dunn, Transfer Pricing Practice in an Era of Recession, 17(1) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 328–329 (2009).
39 For a detailed description of these parameters see Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 16–30. Also see Reyneveld & Bonekamp, supra n. 11, at. 229–232. The comparable analysis
could be undertaken by benchmarking against capital structures of comparable companies.
40 Her Majesty Revenue and Customs, Thin Capitalization: Practical Guidance, INTM 524070.
41 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, paras 1.164–1.166.
42 Ibid., para. 1.167.
43 Ibid., paras 1.164–1.166 & paras 7.12–7.13.
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adjusted a few notches upwards to take into account
implicit support.
20. It could be argued that, at arm’s length, an
independent lender would look into the standalone
credit rating of the borrower. Accordingly, taking
into consideration the parental affiliation to notch up
the credit rating does not comply with the arm’s
length principle. However, it should be noted that
associated enterprises enjoy benefits which are not
available to market participants in uncontrolled
transactions. Therefore, it makes perfect sense to
adjust for implicit support44. The author agrees
with the conclusion of the OECD examples and
states that the standalone credit rating of an entity
needs to be adjusted for implicit support for transfer
pricing purposes. It could well be possible that the
credit rating of the borrower is notched up (for
example Baa to A) due to parental affiliation. The
arm’s length interest rate will then be determined
using the A rating45.
2.2.2 Loan Terms and Conditions
21. For the second step, in addition to ascertaining
the standalone credit rating (as adjusted for implicit
support)46, the terms and conditions47 of the related
party loan such as the (1) market conditions at the
time the loan was issued48, (2) the amount and
tenure of the loan49, (3) the currency in which the
loan was granted and the currency in which it is
required to be repaid50, (4) the seniority or subordi-
nation character of the loan51, (5) the type of interest
payment (fixed or floating)52, (6) loan repayment
schedule or pre-payment options53 and (7) security
offered by the borrower54, needs to be analysed55.
This analysis, under which the features of the related
party loan are ascertained, serves as a foundation to
undertake a comparability analysis to determine the
arm’s length interest rates. As previously discussed,
these terms and conditions should also be on an
arm’s length basis taking into consideration the
borrowers and lenders relevant economic
characteristics56.
2.2.3 Benchmarking Interest Rates: Internal vs
External Comparable Uncontrolled Prices
22. The most common transfer pricing method
applied to benchmark interest rates is the compar-
able uncontrolled price method (CUP). It may be
possible to use internal CUPs57. In such situations
one has to examine the borrowers third party fund-
ing arrangements and make appropriate adjustments
to improve comparability58. Generally, when a bor-
rower obtains third party debt that debt is usually
senior to the related party debt. Accordingly, the
interest rate paid on the third party debt would
not often serve as an appropriate benchmark for the
related party debt. Consequently, adjustments have
to be made to take into account the subordination
feature. Likewise, if a third party lender provides an
Notes
44 See OECD Guidelines, para. 1.10; Averyanova & Sampat, supra n. 2, at 366.
45 See Balkus & Heath, supra n. 11, at 74–75; M. Breggen, Netherlands in Transfer Pricing and Intra Group Financing 430 (IBFD 2012).
46 The US treasury regulations also state that an arm’s length rate of interest shall be ‘a rate of interest which was charged, or would have been charged, at the time the indebtedness arose,
in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar circumstances. All relevant factors shall be considered, including the principal amount and duration of the loan, the
security involved, the credit standing of the borrower, and the interest rate prevailing at the situs of the lender or creditor for comparable loans between unrelated parties’. See US Treasury
Regulations. s. 1.482-2(a)(2)(i) (1994).
47 For features of a third party loan agreements see – Her Majesty Revenue and Customs, Thin Capitalization: Practical Guidance, INTM 522010.
48 It is essential that loans be benchmarked at the time they were issued as credit markets have been fluctuating tremendously since the credit crisis. Reyneveld & Bonekamp,
supra n. 11, 232.
49 In general, long-term loans carry higher interest rates that increase further depending on the degree of subordination whereas short-term loans carry lower interest rates.
50 Interest rates vary depending on the currency of the loan. A loan provided in USD will not have the same return as a loan provided in Japanese Yen. Thus, currency is a key
comparability factor.
51 Loans result in higher credit risks when they are subordinated. On the contrary, when they are senior to other loans, the credit risk and interest rates are lower.
52 Loans that are provided on a variable basis (adjusted annually) are exposed to lower interest rate risks as opposed to loans that are provided on a fixed interest basis.
53 Loans can include different types of options. For instance, the borrower may have the option (call option) to repay before the loan maturity or the lender may have the option
(put option) to collect the loan before maturity. These options play an important role, in particular, in assessing the extent to which such options are exercised on an arm’s
length basis. The value of these options depends on market perceptions.
54 The credit risk of a loan decreases considerably when a borrower provides collaterals for a loan. Appropriate collaterals, in general, reduce the interest rates on loans.
55 Bakker, supra n. 1, at 28.
56 Ledure et al., supra n. 1, at 354.
57 OECD Guidelines, paras 3.27 & 3.28.
58 Bakker, supra n. 1, at 29; Reyneveld & Bonekamp, supra n. 11, at 231.
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interest-bearing loan to a company belonging to the
multinational group then that loan cannot be con-
sidered as a direct comparison to a loan provided by
that third party lender to another member of the
multinational group. This is because there could be
differences in the credit worthiness of the related
party borrowers. Consequently, adjustments have to
be made to take into account the credit rating of the
borrower. Moreover, a bankability letter i.e. letter
from the bank (third party) offering a particular
interest rate to the borrower, may not be considered
as a comparable as it is not an actual transaction even
though it provides good corroborative evidence59.
23. If internal CUPs are not available, external
CUPs60 may be considered61. A benchmarking ana-
lysis can be carried out using information from
publicly available databases such as Thomson
Reuters Loan Connector, Deal Scan or Bloomberg,
which provide information for third party loans62.
The information should pertain to companies with
credit ratings that are comparable to the related
party borrower. Specifically, an appropriate screen-
ing process63 needs to be defined taking into con-
sideration the related party borrowers economic
circumstances64. Ideally, the search would start by
looking into the market circumstances when the
loan was entered into, country of the borrower,
the maturity & currency of the loan and the indus-
try of the borrower. Subsequently, the other loan
terms and conditions have to be considered.
However, perfect external CUPs may not exist65
and when suitable adjustments66 cannot be made,
other methods may need to be explored.
24. In some situations, information from yield
curves such as the Bloomberg Fair Value Curve67
has also been accepted (on an individual basis or as
back up evidence to an external CUP analysis). In a
nutshell, yield curves are based on market interest
rate information on bonds for a large number of
credit ratings, currencies and industries68. Such
curves provide information on interest rates with
maturities ranging from three months to twenty
years. Essentially, the curve indicates at what price
a bond should be traded based on comparable rated
bonds and comparable maturities. In other situa-
tions, taxpayer’s have also used the build-up
approach. Essentially, this approach estimates a risk
free rate such as London Interbank Offer Rate
(LIBOR)69 or Euro Interbank Offer Rate
(EURIBOR)70, to which an arm’s length spread is
added based on transaction specific risks or transac-
tion specific factors such as covenants and subordina-
tions. Corporate bond data may be used by making
the appropriate adjustments71.
25. Furthermore, it is remarked that some tax
authorities apply legal interest rates72 or domestic
Prime Lending Rate (PLR)73 as external CUPs to
benchmark interest rate on cross-border loans. The
application of such standard rates, in the author’s
opinion, is inappropriate, as it does not take into
consideration the borrowers credit rating and the
terms and conditions on which the loan is provided74.
Notes
59 Reyneveld & Bonekamp, supra n. 11, at 231–232.
60 OECD Guidelines, paras 3.30–3.34.
61 Bakker, supra n. 1, at 29.
62 It is preferable to do the comparability analysis with data from the primary corporate loan market as opposed to data from secondary bond market. See J. Hollas & G. Hands,
Intercompany Financial Transactions: Selecting Comparable Data, 18 Transfer Pricing Rpt. 1240 (2010).
63 OECD Guidelines, paras 3.40–3.46.
64 For a detailed external CUP analysis on pricing and designing intercompany debt see: T. Reichert, I. Gray, N. Callard & E. Hutchinson, How to Accurately Price and Design
Intercompany Debt 1–37 (Economic Partners LLC, White Paper Series) (2012).
65 OECD Guidelines, paras 3.48–3.54.
66 For a discussion on adjustments to be made to third party comparables see: J. Hollas & G. Hands, Comparability Adjustments: Finding an Arm’s Length Interest Rate, 18 Tax Mgt.
Transfer Pricing Rpt. 9 (2009).
67 Bakker, supra n. 1, at 29; Also see O. Montero, Forecasting Interest Rates for Future Intercompany Loan Planning: An Alternate Approach, 16(5) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 313–317
(2009).
68 Reyneveld & Bonekamp, supra n. 11, at 231.
69 See http://www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/libor.aspx (31 October 2016).
70 See http://www.euribor-rates.eu/ (31 October 2016).
71 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 29.
72 M. Rasch, L. Moury & D. Pala, Luxembourg Court Case on Intercompany Financing Increases Focus on Transfer Pricing, 21(2) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 107–109 (2014).
73 The rates at which the top Indian banks lend to customers. This system has been replaced by a base lending rate system. See http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/
india-business/RBI-changes-prime-lending-rate-system-to-base-rate/articleshow/5558281.cms (31 October 2016).
74 See Cotton Naturals India Pvt. Ltd, ITA No. 233/2014 (AY 2007–2008), 27 Mar. 2015.
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In the following section, the author critically explores
two Court judgments to check whether taxpayers
follow the aforementioned process or not. If not,
what is the outcome?
2.2.4 Court Decisions on Intercompany Loans from
a Transfer Pricing Perspective
2.2.4.1 Finland: OY Case
26. Facts: The taxpayer (Company OY)75, a Finnish
company, belonged to a Nordic Group. The tax-
payer engaged into two loans from a third party
bank. The loans carried an interest rate of 3.25%
and 3.135%. The securities that were offered as a
collateral on this loan amounted to EUR 41 mil-
lion. Pursuant to a group refinancing arrangement,
the taxpayer paid off its bank loans by obtaining a
credit facility from a related company in Sweden (B
AB). The loan from the Swedish company carried
an interest rate of 9.5%. This rate was determined
on the basis of the average interest rates that B AB
was required to pay to its creditors. Specifically, B
AB had taken loans from unrelated parties (secured
loans between 3.92% and 7.45% and unsecured
loans between 12.53% and 16.50%) and related
parties (shareholder loans at 17%). The securities
that were offered as a collateral on this loan
amounted to EUR 302 million. After the refinan-
cing was completed, the taxpayer made an interest
payment to B AB. The tax authorities considered
the interest rate of 9.5% to be excessive and
allowed a deduction of the payment only up to
3.25% (the interest paid by the taxpayer to the
banks). The taxpayer appealed to the Adjustment
Board of the Large Taxpayers Office. The adjust-
ment board calculated the average interest rates
that B AB was required to pay to unrelated parties
(shareholder loans were excluded) and concluded
that an interest rate of 7.04% is at arm’s length.
The Helsinki Administrative Court upheld this rate
too. The tax authorities brought the case before the
Supreme Administrative Court. The key question
that arose in this case, from a Finnish transfer
pricing perspective, was whether the average inter-
est rate of 7.04% was at arm’s length?
27. The judgment: The Supreme Administrative
Court, after examining the facts of the case, held in
favour of the tax authorities. The Court, firstly,
observed the capital structure of the taxpayer did
not change post the refinancing arrangement.
Secondly, B AB did not provide any additional
financial services (except refinancing) that would
have justified a higher interest rate. Lastly, and
more importantly, an interest rate of 7.04% cannot
be justified when the taxpayer, based on its own
credit worthiness, could have obtained a loan at
cheaper rates. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the interest rate of 3.25% which was payable to third
party banks by the taxpayer has to be used as a
benchmark and can be considered to be at arm’s
length.
28. Key issues: Several issues merit attention.
Firstly, a taxpayer will enter into a refinance arrange-
ment to take advantage of a better interest rate.
However, in this case, the refinancing arrangement
led to higher interest rate. Accordingly, it is ques-
tionable as to whether the refinancing arrangement
was ‘commercially rational’? Secondly, it is also at odds
that the interest rate charged to the taxpayer was
high even though the provision of security increased
substantially. Normally, appropriate collaterals
reduce the interest rates on loans. Thirdly, the tax-
payer calculated its interest rate on the basis of
interest that was payable by the group. This clearly
contrasts with the arm’s length process for setting
interest rates. Nevertheless, the Court’s decision is
reasonable as it held that the interest rate should be
calculated on the basis of the taxpayers own credit
worthiness. However, the Court did not discuss the
impact of implicit support on the credit rating of the
borrower. Overall, in the author’s opinion, the Court
did not approach this case in a structured manner
and did not discuss several issues.
2.2.4.2 Australia: The Chevron Judgment
29. Facts: The taxpayer76, an Australian company
viz., Chevron Holding (CAHPL), owned a US com-
pany viz., Chevron Finance (CFC) with which it
entered into a credit facility in June 2003. Under
the credit facility CFC was required to provide a loan
Notes
75 The author did not manage to obtain a translation of this case in English. The analysis is based on an article published in a journal. See M. Raunio, Supreme Administrative
Court Ruling on Interest Rate Reflecting Creditworthiness of Individual Companies, 18(4) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 296–301 (2011).
76 Chevron Australia Holding Pty v. Commissioner (No 4) (2015), FCA 1092, 23 Oct. 2015. Also see M. Butler, J. Pengelly & R. Neilson, Federal Court Hands Down Transfer Pricing
Decision in Chevron Australia Case, 23(1) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 296–301.
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to CAHPL. CAHPL was going to use the funds for
repaying an existing debt and fund further develop-
ment of its upstream business. The interest, which
was payable monthly, was determined on the basis of
1 month Australian LIBOR-BBA plus 4.14% per
annum (the interest rate effectively applied on the
loan was 8.15%). The loan was repayable in five
years with an option of early repayment. Further,
CAHPL neither issued any security against the loan
and nor did any group company, especially the ulti-
mate US Parent (CVX), provide a financial guarantee
to CFC. Moreover, the loan arrangement was not
subject to any financial covenants. In order to meet
its commitment under the credit facility, CFC bor-
rowed funds from the US commercial market at 2%
in United States Dollars (USD) and on lent it to
CAHPL in Australian Dollars (AUD). Thereafter,
the taxpayer made an interest payment to CFC.
The tax authorities considered the interest payment
to be excessive and disallowed a major part of the
deduction (the taxable income was raised and penal-
ties were levied). The key question that arose in this
case before the Australian Federal Court, from a
transfer pricing perspective, was whether the interest
rate applied by the taxpayer was at arm’s length
(whether or not CFC should be entitled to the inter-
est income is discussed in section 2.3.2)? The issue
was analysed in light of Division 13 of the
Australian Income Tax Act (1936) – applicable for
the year up to July 2004 – and Division 815A of the
Australian Income Tax Act (1997) – applicable from
July 2004 to June 2013.
30. Re-characterization under Division 13: At the
outset, the question arose under Division 13, as to
whether the loan arrangement can be re-characterized?
The tax authorities argued that, at arm’s length, no
lender would have provided a loan to CAHPL77. This
was because the loan facility lacked financial covenants
and appropriate securities. Moreover, CVX did not
provide a guarantee to CFC on behalf of CAHPL78.
Accordingly, the arrangement should be re-character-
ized to equity. However, due to the manner in which
Division 13 was worded (it authorized only price
adjustments by using the term ‘consideration’) the
Court held that the loan agreement between CAHPL
and CFC should be used as a starting point. The Court
seems to have accepted that a comparison should be
made between the terms and condition of the related
party loan with independent party loans79. Therefore,
the loan arrangement was not recharacterized.
Moreover, It was also argued that the funding should
be denominated in USD as opposed to AUD as CFC,
which operated in the American market, raised funds
solely for the purpose of on-lending them. This issue
was raised because the interest rates applicable to USD
denominated loans were lower than AUD denominated
loans80. However, the Court held that loan currency
was in AUD. This was because the taxpayer had
demonstrated that if the loan were taken in USD it
would have been exposed to significant foreign
exchange risks81. A key takeaway from this discussion
is that structural adjustments can be made only if
authorized by domestic law. Before entering into the
discussion on comparables, the Court provided its com-
ments on credit rating and implicit support.
31. Credit rating and implicit support: The tax
authorities and various experts agreed that a credit
rating analysis of the borrowing company had to be
carried out to determine the arm’s length interest rate.
The Court agreed with this conclusion but held that the
borrowers credit worthiness should be seen from the
perspective of a commercial lender (such as a bank) as
opposed to a credit rating agency82. The author has no
issue with using the credit rating methodology of
banks. However, such processes are not transparent.
Thus, in the author’s opinion, the Court is erroneous
in disregarding the use of ratings issued by credit rating
agencies. Credit rating agencies, by issuing a rating,
also provide an accurate estimation of the borrowers
debt capacity to meet its financial obligations on a
timely basis. In fact, in a transfer pricing analysis, it is
common practice to refer to credit ratings issued by
rating agencies. Accordingly, they should not be dis-
regarded.Moreover, the question arose as to whether an
adjustment is required to be made to the borrower for
the implicit support that it receives from being
Notes
77 Chevron (2015), para. 495.
78 Ibid., para. 496.
79 Ibid., para. 499.
80 Ibid., para. 497.
81 Ibid., para. 583.
82 Ibid., para. 503. This was because sufficient evidence was presented to show that commercial lenders and rating agencies adopted different approaches to determine the credit
worthiness of the borrower. See Ibid., para. 254.
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affiliated with a multinational group. The taxpayer
argued that the credit rating should not be notched
up on account on implicit support and only the standa-
lone rating should be considered. The tax authorities on
the other hand argued that group affiliations had to be
factored in order to determine the arm’s length price.
The judge held that implicit support should be taken
into consideration but its existence remains a matter of
fact. Nevertheless, in the present case, implicit support
had a very little impact on the pricing by a lender. This
was due to the absence of an explicit financial guarantee
by the parent company83. While the author’s agrees
with the statement that the existence of implicit sup-
port is a matter of fact, its disregard in the current case
does not seem to be justified. It is the author’s view that
implicit support should be factored in the credit rating
process (see section 2.2.1).
32. Comparables: The taxpayer had appointed sev-
eral expert witnesses to the case. Mr Martin had
estimated CAHPL to have a credit rating of weak
BB84. In light of this rating, he was of the opinion
that institutional investors (and not banks) would
have provided loans to CAHPL, with spreads higher
than what was charged by CFC. The spreads were
determined on the basis of spreads applicable to
institutional loans as adjusted for underwriting
fees, lack of financial covenants, security and size
premiums85. Moreover, another witness, Mr Gross,
had estimated CAHPL to have a credit rating of B+.
In light of this rating, he was of the opinion that if
CAHPL had borrowed the funds from an indepen-
dent party then the interest rate would have been 1
month Australian LIBOR-BBA (base rate) plus a
spread of 4%. The spread was determined on the
basis of the interest rate charged by institutional
investors (and not banks) and adjustments made for
lack of covenants, upfront fees and a discount for pre-
payment86. Both witnesses argued that the interest
payment was at arm’s length as CAHPL had paid a
lower amount. However, the Court put aside the
analysis of both witnesses. The independent party
loans i.e. the comparables presented by both wit-
nesses were inaccurate as the terms and conditions
of the independent party loans were significantly
different from the terms and conditions agreed
between CFC and CAHPL. Specifically, they were
differences because security and financial covenants
exist in independent party loans whereas these were
not reflected in the related party loans. Moreover, the
independent party loans were for different tenors,
different credit ratings, were provided in different
industries and were provided in different markets87.
The inability of the taxpayer to provide appropriate
comparables clearly showed that the terms and con-
dition to the related party loan facility did not exist
between an independent lender and commercial bor-
rower. As the taxpayer had failed to demonstrate the
arm’s length nature of the payment, the Court ruled
in favour of the tax authorities. The case shows that
high standards of comparability to benchmark inter-
est rates using the CUP method.
33. Re-characterization under Division 815A:
The Court ruled that the approach adopted in
Division 815A was different from the approach
in Division 1388. The Court ruled that the tax
authorities can question not only the price of the
transaction but also transaction conditions89 (as
this division used the term ‘conditions’ as opposed
to ‘consideration’). The Court concluded that if the
level of debt in the related party transaction is
higher than what independent parties would
agree then the debt level of the related party
transaction should be reduced90. As the taxpayer
had failed to demonstrate the arm’s length nature
of the conditions, the Court ruled in favour of the
tax authorities91. The author agrees with this line
of reasoning in light of his previous analysis (see
section 2.1.2).
Notes
83 Chevron (2015), para. 606.
84 Ibid., para. 490.
85 Ibid., para. 489.
86 Ibid., para. 491.
87 Ibid., paras 504–525.
88 Ibid., para. 591.
89 Ibid., para. 600.
90 Ibid., paras 604–614.
91 Ibid., para. 614.
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2.3 Lenders State: Allocation of Returns
Based on Risks
2.3.1 The Illustration Fact Pattern
34. Consider the following illustration:
Company A (tax resident of State A) sets up
Company B (tax resident of State B), an appro-
priately capitalized financing entity in a low tax
European jurisdiction. Company B, which operates
in Euros, is responsible to provide funding to
group’s entities. Among several transactions,
Company B provides a loan facility of AUD 100
million to Company C (tax resident of Australia)
at an interest rate of 8%. The could analysis indi-
cates that the borrowers borrowing capacity can
accommodate the loan. Moreover, would analysis
indicates that the loan proceeds are used towards
acquiring equipment necessary for the functioning
of Company C. Accordingly; the loan arrangement
is commercially justified. The interest rate, which
can be considered to be arm’s length rate, com-
prises of a risk free rate92 of 0.25% and a risk
adjusted rate93 of 7.75%. The latter rate repre-
sents the financial risk borne by the lender. In
effect, the financial risk comprises of the credit94,
interest rate95 and foreign exchange96 risk.
35. Under Case 1, Company B employs two
finance professionals. These professionals are
involved in loan creation97 and loan management
activities98 for the entire group. These personnel
report to the local board of directors (residents of
State B) who, based on their inputs, approve the
funding decisions. Under Case 2, Company B
does not employ any professionals. Moreover, its
directors, who are tax residents of State A, travel
to State B once a year wherein they approve and
formalize the funding decisions. These decisions
are based on the analysis received by the finance
team of Company A who, principally, perform
the loan creation and loan management activities.
The question analysed in this section is whether
Company B should be allocated the financing
return (interest income) in both cases?
2.3.2 The Arm’s Length Allocation of Risks and
Returns
36. The revised guidance provides that returns will
be allocated to an entity that bears the associated
risks99. In this regard, the following framework for
analysing risks (see Table 1) is provided in order to
accurately delineate the controlled transaction100.
Table 1 Framework for Analysing Risks
Step 1 Identify the economically significant risk
Step 2 Understand which party bears the risk
contractually
Step 3 Through a functional analysis determine
which party assumes and manages the
risk, in particular, which party controls
the risk and has the financial capacity to
bear the risk
Step 4 Understand whether the contractual
assumption of risk consistent with the
conduct of the parties
Step 5 If not, under this step, allocate the returns
based on which party controls the risk and
has the financial capacity to bear the risk
Step 6 Delineate the actual transaction
Notes
92 Risk free interest rate is a rate of return of an investment with no risk of financial loss.
93 Risk adjusted interest rate is a rate of return which calculates an investment return based on the associated risks.
94 Credit risk is a risk that the customer will not be able repay the principal and interest amounts. See OECD, 2010 Report on Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishment
(OECD Attribution Report) 68 (OECD 22 July 2010).
95 Interest rate risk is a risk that the market interest rates will fluctuate in comparison to the rates used when the intercompany loan agreement was negotiated. See OECD
Attribution Report, 68.
96 Foreign exchange risk is a risk that arises from movements in exchange rates for loans denominated in foreign currencies. OECD Attribution Report, 68.
97 Creation of loans involves the following activities (inclusive list): 1) negotiating the terms and conditions, 2) evaluating the various financial risks associated with the loan, 3)
analysing the credit worthiness of the borrower, 4) undertaking the steps to price a loan, 5) deciding on whether collateral or securities are required & 6) undertaking steps to
formalize the loans etc. See OECD Attribution Report, 65.
98 Managing of loans involves the following activities (inclusive list): 1) undertaking loan support functions such as collecting the interest, monitoring repayments,
determining the value of collaterals, 2) monitoring the financial risks on an ongoing basis by reviewing the credit worthiness of the borrower, analysing market interest
movements, analysing the profitability of the loan, 3) undertaking necessary steps to hedge risks associated with the loan & 4) deciding on whether refinancing the loan is
required or not etc. See OECD Attribution Report, 65.
99 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, paras 1.56–1.59. Also see I. Verlinden, D. Ledure & M. Dessy, The Risky Side of Transfer Pricing: The OECD Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Reports Sharpens the Rules on Risk Allocation under the Arm’s Length Standard, 23(2) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. (2016), published online, s. 3.
100 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 1.60.
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37. In the above illustration, under both cases, finan-
cial risk can be regarded as the economically significant
risk101. Further, the lender bears the risk contra-
ctually102. Moreover, after undertaking a functional
analysis103 in Case 1, a strong argument can be made
that Company B should be entitled to the entire finan-
cing return of 8%. This is because that entity controls104
the financial risk through its employees. Specifically,
Company B employs personnel and these personnel’s
functions demonstrate that they have the capability to
make decisions with respect to (1) taking on, laying off
or declining financial risks and (2) deciding on whether
and how to respond to the various financial risks
associated with the decisions making opportunity.
Moreover, the entity also demonstrates that it can per-
form the decision-making activity associated with the
risks. Furthermore, even if the management of risks is
outsourced, the personnel in Company B have the cap-
ability to demonstrate that they can oversee and manage
the outsourced risks105. Additionally, Company B has
the financial capacity106 to bear the risk (for instance,
Company B has the necessary funds to assume and
mitigate this risk by entering into hedging transactions
such as credit default swaps).
38. Under Case 2, the functional analysis would indi-
cate that Company B does not carry out any loan creation
or management activities. Consequently, the contractual
assumption of the financial risk is not in line with the
conduct of the parties. In the context of cash boxes107,
the revised guidance has made it clear that if an entity
does not control108 the financial risks over the debt
funding but simply acts on the direction of other mem-
bers of the multinational group then (1) that entity will
not be attributed the profits linked to the financial risks
and as a consequence will be entitled to no more than a
risk-free return or, (2) less than a risk free return if, for
instance, the transaction is not commercially justified
and therefore the non-recognition rules apply109. As a
result, Company B should be entitled only to a risk free
return of 0.25% or even a lower return if the transaction
is disregarded. Thus, Company A shall be allocated the
risk. The allocation of risks under both cases is based on
the proposed framework is highlighted in Table 2.
Table 2 Allocation of Risks and Return
Case 1 Case 2
Step 1 Financial risk which comprises of credit, interest rate
and foreign exchange risk is identified as an econom-
ically significant risk
Step 2 Which party
bears the finan-
cial risk
contractually
Company B Company B
Step 3 Which party
controls the risk
and has the
financial capa-
city to bear the
risk
Company B Company A
Step 4 Is the contrac-
tual assumption
of risk consistent
with the conduct
of the parties
Yes No
Step 5 Allocate the
returns based on
which party
controls the risk
and has the
financial capa-
city to bear the
risk
Company B is
allocated the
financial risk and
the associated
return
Company A is
allocated the
financial risk
and the asso-
ciated return (at
most Company B
shall be allocated
a risk free
return)
Notes
101 For an overview of the various economically significant risks see OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, paras 1.71–1.76.
102 For a discussion on contractual assumption of risks see OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, paras 1.77–1.81.
103 The functional analysis serves as a basis to understand which parties assume or manage the risk, in particular, 1) which enterprise performs the control and risk
management function, 2) which enterprise encounters the upside or downside or risk outcomes & 3) which enterprise has the financial capacity to bear the risks.
See OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, paras 1.82–1.85.
104 See OECD Guidelines, paras 9.22–9.28; The revised guidance elaborates on this and provides that control over risk involves ‘(i) the capability to make decisions to take on, lay off, or
decline a risk-bearing opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision-making function and (ii) the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated
with the opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision making function. It is not necessary for a party to perform the day-to-day mitigation… in order to have control of the risks.
Such day-to-day mitigation may be outsourced’. See OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 1.65, para. 1.69 & para. 1.70; Bullen, supra n. 5, at 496–507.
105 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 6.63; Also see Example 6, Ch. VI, OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, 119–120.
106 SeeOECDGuidelines, paras 9.29–9.32. The revised guidance elaborates on this and provides that the financial capacity to assume risk ‘can be defined as access to funding to take on the risk or to
lay off the risk, to pay for the risk mitigation functions and to bear the consequences of the risk if the risk materializes’. See OECDRevisedGuidelines onAction 8–10, para. 1.64;Also seeBullen, supran. 5, at
482–497.
107 Such entities have been defined as ‘capital rich entities without any other relevant economic activities’. See OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, 11.
108 If the directors of Company B formalize the funding decision in State B by holding local meetings, documenting minutes and signing documents, although the funding
decision was made in State A, then it is clearly stated that the decision making function exercised by the directors does not qualify as an exercise which demonstrates control
over the risks. See OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 1.66.
109 OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, para. 1.85 & para. 1.103. Also see Example 16, Ch. VI, OECD Revised Guidelines on Action 8–10, 129–130.
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39. The facts of Case 2, from the lenders perspec-
tive, resemble the facts of the Chevron judgment. In
that case, CFC had provided a loan to CAHPL. It
should be noted that Mr Dalzell, an internal
employee of the Chevron group, confirmed that
CFC did not have any staff of its own. CVX’s treas-
ury team undertook all decisions with respect to its
activities110. Therefore, the question can be raised as
to whether CFC should be entitled to any interest
income? If one applies the aforementioned OECD
view, the answer should be in the negative. The
financial risk should be allocated to CVX. It is
indicated that CAHPL has appealed to the
Australian Full Federal Court. The author suggests
the Court to analyse as to whether CVX should be
allocated the interest income from a transfer pricing
perspective under Australian transfer pricing rules.
2.4 Intercompany Loan Agreements
40. As a best practice, it is recommended that
multinationals prepare appropriate legal documenta-
tion for intercompany loans111. A lesson can be learnt
from the Chevron case is that related party loans
should be structured in the same manner as unrelated
party loans. It the agreement lacks certain clauses
(such as security, financial covenants, clarity on sub-
ordination), tax authorities may attribute that clause
and could either re-write the agreement or deny
associated interest deductions. Thus, intercompany
loan agreements need to be drafted/re-drafted or
even modified in an appropriate manner as the agree-
ment serves as a starting point to justify the nature of
the taxpayer’s dealings in transfer pricing audits. If
not, tax disputes on intercompany loans will rise112.
2.5 The Master File, Local File and Country
by Country Reporting
41. Action 13 of the BEPS plan seeks to enhance
transparency in transfer pricing matters by ensuring
that multinational companies disclose to all the
relevant governments with information with respect
to their global allocation of income, economic activ-
ities and taxes paid among countries according to a
common template. Essentially, a master file, local
file and country-by-country reporting template is
proposed113. The role of the master file is to pro-
vide high level information about the multinational
group such as the organizational structure, descrip-
tion of business and what drives value in it, intan-
gible assets, intercompany financial transactions114
and the multinationals financial and tax positions.
The role of the local file is to provide a detailed
analysis of the application of the arm’s length prin-
ciple with respect to the transactions that take
place between the local country affiliate and the
associated enterprises in different countries. The
country-by-country report, which is required to be
filed annually, requires multinationals to provide
information (such as revenues, profit before taxes
paid, employees etc.) for each tax jurisdiction
in which they operate115. Moreover, at the EU
level, a similar initiative on automatic exchange of
country-by-country reporting has been proposed and
adopted116. Consequently, intra-group financial
transactions will have to be reported pursuant to
these documentation requirements. The disclosures
will provide a comprehensive view to the tax autho-
rities on how a multinational organizes its finan-
cing activities117.
Notes
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116 See EU Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation (EU
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Information in the Field of Taxation (EU Commission 25 May 2016).
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3 THE IMPACT OF OTHER BEPS
DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
WITH TRANSFER PRICING RULES
3.1 Introductory Comments
42. Intercompany loans are often considered in the
context of tax optimization because interest is gen-
erally deductible under the tax laws of most coun-
tries. Considering the high mobility of capital, the
impact of intra-group loans on the effective tax rate
is further optimized by multinationals having enti-
ties in jurisdictions with favourable tax regimes or
low corporate tax rates. In the following sections, the
author discusses the impact of other BEPS related
actions on intercompany loans. Included in the ana-
lysis are the various developments at the EU level, in
particular, the proposals put forward by the EU
Commission on fighting tax avoidance practices i.e.
the anti-tax avoidance directive proposing amend-
ments to domestic law118 and the recommendation
proposing amendments to tax treaties concluded by
EU Member States119. Moreover, their relationship
with transfer pricing rules is discussed.
3.2 The Borrowers Perspective
3.2.1 Limiting Interest Deductions
43. Action 4 of the BEPS Plan120 deals with limit-
ing interest deductions121. Essentially, the final report
provides recommendations in designing domestic law
rules to prevent base erosion through the use of
(excess) interest expenses. A fixed ratio rule is recom-
mended to restrict interest deductions. The rule
restricts the interest payment of an entity of a group
to a percentage of that entities earning before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The
recommendation leaves open the possibility for
countries to choose a percentage between 10–30%
based on certain parameters122. Furthermore, the
report recommends countries to incorporate a group
ratio rule alongside the fixed ratio rule. This approach
would enable entities with net interest expense above
a country’s fixed ratio rule to deduct interest up to the
level of the net interest/EBITDA ratio of its world-
wide group. Likewise, at the EU level, Article 4 of the
anti-tax avoidance directive provides for a similar
interest limitation rule123. These developments
could restrict interest paid by entities even if the
funding and corresponding payments are at arm’s
length124. Consequently, intercompany financing
(depending on the structure adopted by the taxpayer)
may result in double taxation as interest income may
be fully taxable in the country of the creditor and the
corresponding interest expense may be non-deductible
in the State of the debtor125. Nevertheless, the double
taxation could be minimized if the excess interest is
carried forward126.
3.2.2 Hybrid Mismatches
44. Multinationals on several occasions have used
complex financial instruments that have features of
equity and debt (hybrid instruments) and entities
that have features of partnerships and corporations
(hybrid entities) to optimize on their taxes.
Essentially, taxes were optimized using differences
in countries domestic laws with respect to such
instruments and entities127. Action 2 of the BEPS
Plan128 deals with eliminating such mismatches.
Part I of the report provides for domestic law
provisions that can be used by States to neutralize
mismatches under which payments (including
interest) are deductible in one State and non-
taxable in another State. Essentially, the report
suggests linking rules that align the tax treatment
Notes
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120 OECD/G20, BEPS, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 – 2015 Final Report (OECD/G20 05 Oct. 2015).
121 E. Millan & M. Roch, Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deduction and Others, 43(1) Intertax 58–60 (2015).
122 OECD, supra n. 120, at 11.
123 EU Commission, supra n. 118, Art. 4. Also see Millan & Roch, supra n. 121, at 65–67. The author’s discuss the impact of EU law on interest deduction rules.
124 Millan & Roch, supra n. 121, at 69–71; Also see J. Hülshorst et al., Transfer Pricing Implications of Action 4 Under the OECD’s BEPS Initiative, 23(2) Intl. Transfer Pricing J.
(2016), published online, s. 4.
125 P. Janssens, D. Ledure, B. Vandpitte & J. Loos, The End of Intra Group Financing … or Not Just Yet ? – Part 1, 55(7) Eur. Taxn. 280–284 (July 2015).
126 OECD, supra n. 120, at 68–70.
127 R. Boer & O. Marres, BEPS Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 43(1) Intertax 14–21 (2015).
128 OECD/G20, BEPS, Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 – 2015 Final Report (OECD/G20 05 Oct. 2015).
Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intra - Group Loans in Light of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan
899
of an instrument or entity129 with the tax treat-
ment in the other jurisdiction. A rule order in the
form of a primary rule and a secondary or defensive
rule is put forward. Under the primary rule, a
Contracting State may deny the taxpayer a deduc-
tion for a payment to the extent that it is not
included in the taxable income of the recipient in
the other Contracting State or it is also deductible
in the other Contracting State. If a State does not
apply the primary rule then the other Contracting
State can generally apply a defensive rule, requiring
the deductible payment to be included in income
or denying the duplicate deduction depending on
the nature of the mismatch130. Similarly, Article 9
of the anti-tax avoidance directive recommends
Member States to adopt similar linking rules to
counteract hybrid mismatches131. These develop-
ments could restrict interest deductibility even if
the funding and corresponding payments are at
arm’s length132.
3.3 The Lenders Perspective
3.3.1 Controlled Foreign Company Rules
45. The issue of controlled foreign companies
(CFC) is dealt in Action 3 of the BEPS plan133.
The report provides recommendations in the form
of building blocks for designing CFC rules.
Essentially, building blocks with respect to (1)
definition of a CFC, (2) CFC exemption and
threshold requirements, (3) definition of CFC
income, (4) computation of CFC income, (5) attri-
bution of the CFC’s income to the shareholder and
(6) rules regarding preventing double taxation are
provided134. The report provides countries the
flexibility to design their CFC rules taking into
consideration their overall policy objectives.
Within the EU, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) case law, in particular, the Cadbury
Schweppes135 judgment restricts the application of
CFC rules to only wholly artificial arrangements.
The OECD has recognized that a conflict can arise
between CFC rules and the EU freedom of estab-
lishment/capital and has put forward several sugges-
tions to avoid such conflicts (such as a substance
analysis or extension of CFC rules to domestic and
cross-border subsidiaries)136. Similarly, Article 7-8
of the anti-tax avoidance directive recommends
Member States to adopt CFC rules with respect to
entities that can be considered wholly artificial or if
the entities engage in non-genuine arrangements137.
It could well be possible that income (interest
income) derived by intermediary entities, even
though they are at arm’s length, could be subject
to CFC rules of their parent State thereby leading
to economic double taxation138.
3.3.2 Denial of Treaty Benefits
46. Action 6 of the BEPS plan139 deals with pre-
venting treaty abuse. The final report suggests coun-
tries to incorporate a minimum standard by
changing the title and preamble of their treaty to
reflect the objective of preventing tax evasion and tax
avoidance (including treaty shopping) coupled with
either (1) a principal purpose test (PPT rule) and
limitation of benefit (LOB) clause or (2) a LOB
clause with a narrow PPT rule for conduit financing
situations or (3) only the PPT rule140. Furthermore,
the report suggests other treaty related changes to
Notes
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140 Ibid., at 10.
Intertax
900
combat other tax avoidant structures (typically rule
shopping)141. Moreover, at the EU level, EU
Commission recommends Member States to insert
the PPT rule in their treaty network142. It could
well be possible that a lender within a multinational
group does not satisfy the stringent requirements of
the LOB clause in order to qualify as a resident of a
Contracting State due to its light economic substance
and the fact that it derives or pays interest from/to
external jurisdictions. Furthermore, even if the tax-
payer satisfies the LOB clause, depending on the facts
and circumstances, it may not satisfy the subjective
and objective requirements of the PPT rule143.
Accordingly, arm’s length interest paid to such enti-
ties could be exposed to high withholding taxes in the
State of source if treaty benefits are denied144.
3.3.3 Harmful Tax Regimes and Tax Rulings
47. Action 5 of the BEPS plan145 deals with counter-
acting harmful tax competition taking into considera-
tion transparency and substance. The final report states
that the OECD/G20 countries agree to strengthen the
‘substantial activity requirement’ that has been used to
assess preferential tax regimes. Specifically for
Intellectual Property (IP) box regimes, the report pro-
poses the nexus approach. Under this approach, profits
made by taxpayer utilizing an IP box regime are
exempt only to the extent the taxpayer itself incurs
the qualifying research and development (R&D)
expenses that gave rise to the IP income. The idea
behind the requirement is that the taxpayer should
actually carry out the activity and incurs the related
expenses in order to benefit from these regimes146. This
requirement has also been extended to non–IP
regimes147. Accordingly, taxpayers can benefit from
other regimes, such as financing regimes148, to the
extent that the taxpayer itself undertook the ‘core
income-generating activities’ required to produce the
type of income covered by the financing regime. Such
activities could include loan creation and loan manage-
ment activities149. This would imply that the entity
has well qualified & knowledgeable staff that can make
decisions with respect to the financial risks (see section
2.3). Accordingly, in the author’s opinion, convergence
exists between the notion of ‘control over risks’ and ‘core
income-generating activities’ as put forward by the OECD.
48. Moreover, to promote transparency, the final
report suggests States to exchange information on
preferential tax rulings on a compulsory spontaneous
basis in order to avoid BEPS concerns. Such rulings
include rulings on preferential regimes (such as finan-
cial regimes) or unilateral advance pricing arrange-
ments (APA) in respect of transfer pricing150. At the
EU level, the impact of EU State Aid rules151 on tax
rulings, in particular, rulings dealing with transfer
pricing arrangements are gaining importance. The
EU Commission has been contesting that States
which have granted taxpayers (such as Fiat152) uni-
lateral APA’s are providing illegal State Aid. If proven
to be true, the concerned State will have to recover the
amount of aid plus interest for up to ten years153.
4 THE WAY FORWARD
4.1 Recommendation
49. Transfer Pricing issues with respect to intra-
group finance is a leading area of controversy154. As
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limited guidance exists on this topic, the OECD, in
Action 4 of the BEPS plan has indicated that further
work will be undertaken with respect to transfer
pricing aspects of financial transactions (in 2016 and
2017). The guidance is expected to be on ‘pricing of
related party financial transactions, including financial and
performance guarantees, derivatives (including internal deri-
vatives used in intra-bank dealings), and captive and other
insurance arrangements’. As a start, the OECD may want
to use the author’s analysis (see section 2), in drafting its
guidance on topics dealing with financial intra-group
transactions (in particular loan arrangements)155. It is
also essential that the OECD highlights to States that
Article 9(1) by itself does not authorize structural or
valuation adjustments for intercompany loans. Such
adjustments have to be authorized by the domestic
law. Thus, the author also suggests the OECD to
recommend domestic legislation that can give effect
to arm’s length adjustments.
4.2 Transfer Pricing Disputes
50. The Court judgments discussed in this con-
tribution clearly show the tax authorities have
started questioning the arm’s length nature of
intercompany loans. The areas in which transfer
pricing disputes can be expected are (1) terms and
conditions reflected in related party loans that are
not found in independent party loans – thereby
leading to non-recognition of the loan transaction,
(2) disagreements on the credit ratings used by the
taxpayer, (3) using internal or external CUP’s with-
out making suitable adjustments, (4) the screening
data used for conducting an external CUP analysis
may not reflect the related borrowers economic
conditions and (5) using interest rates set by
banks or financial institutions as an external com-
parable. Accordingly, in order to avoid transfer
pricing disputes, large taxpayers should consider
entering into unilateral or preferably bilateral
advance pricing agreements (or even when possible
a multilateral advance pricing agreement) with the
relevant jurisdiction(s)156. Further, for arrangements
that are already in litigation, taxpayers should eval-
uate the possibility of entering into a mutual agree-
ment procedure (MAP) pursuant to treaties that
contain Article 25 of the OECD Model157 (or
arbitration)158.
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